INTRODUCTION
Simplicity and flexibility are the main themes in the Commonwealth Government's promotion of Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs). They should be easily understood by both employers and employees, in order to allow 'arrangements that suit their workplaces and preferences' (OEA 1998a: 3) . In contrast to State or Federal awards, which are portrayed as excessively long and prescriptive, AWAs are intended to be brief and considerably less detailed. The Office of the Employment Advocate (OEA), the agency charged with popularising these agreements, has repeatedly stressed the mutual benefits to be achieved through this greater simplicity and flexibility. For example, pay structures can be collapsed into a single rate, ostensibly incorporating overtime, penalty rates, shift loadings, allowances, annual leave and sick leave.
These themes of simplification and flexibility also extend to performance-based pay and bonuses, allowing variations above and below the relevant award, and salary packaging, presented as a means of providing benefits to employees (principally tax concessions) at no cost to employers (OEA 1998a: 7) . With respect to non-financial benefits, the government has placed particular emphasis on the flexibility AWAs can offer employees to balance their work and family responsibilities (OEA 1998b) . Greater work and family flexibility can be used as THE JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, VOL. 43, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2001, 387-401 a trade-off against other areas, including pay, in the 'global' (rather than pointby-point) 'no disadvantage' test applied by the OEA. Consequently, there may be an 'apparent loss' financially for the employee in comparison to the relevant industrial award, but this may be compensated for by more flexible working hours (OEA 1998a: 18) .
OEA records reveal that 134 854 AWAs had been signed and approved by the OEA, covering 2577 employers, by 31 October 2000 (OEA website accessed 8 November 2000) . 1 Almost half of all employers with AWAs were located in four sectors (15% in retail, 14% in property and business services, 10% in transport and storage, 9% in manufacturing). 2 Nearly 90% of all employers making AWAs are in the private sector, with only 10% in the public sector. Such employers tend to be relatively small--70% of employers with AWAs employ fewer than 100 staff--but they employ only 22% of employees covered by AWAs.
Males and females are covered by AWAs in exact proportion to their share of the workforce (57% and 43% respectively). In terms of occupation, AWAs are to be found disproportionately amongst managers, who account for 23% of all AWAs, compared to only 7% of all employed persons (DEWRSB 1999: 95) . 3 By contrast, 'blue-collar' workers account for only 17% of AWAs but 32% of all employed persons (DEWRSB 1999: 95) . Finally, it is clear that AWAs are still relatively insignificant in terms of the overall workforce. They cover more than 5% of the workforce in only three sectors--communication services (9.6%), mining (7.0%) and Government administration and defence (5.7%). In every other sector, coverage is below 4% (OEA website).
While much is known about the number and dispersion of AWAs through the Australian labour force, little has been written about the content or impact of AWAs (Wooden 1999: 1) . Nonetheless, there is a growing body of data tracking some basic features of AWAs which allows us to draw some conclusions about the broad direction of AWAs. One useful way of assessing AWAs is by reference to the debate over 'hard' and 'soft' HRM.
There has been considerable debate within the HRM literature as to the respective merits of 'hard' and 'soft' approaches. 'Hard' approaches grew to prominence in the 1980s, as HRM sought to address the perceived weakness of personnel management by forging for itself a more 'strategic' role. Hendry and Pettigrew (1990) describe 'hard' HRM as utilitarian and instrumental, requiring the close integration of an organisation's HRM policies with its business strategy. In a management tradition that can be traced back to Taylorism, 'hard' approaches have been associated predominantly with unitarist understandings of organisations, in which managerial prerogative, HRM's role in achieving 'bottom line' success and its preparedness to take tough decisions are emphasised. Employees are typically viewed as a passive factor of production and an expense, encouraging a commensurate emphasis on labour costs and numerical flexibility, to the neglect of developmental and personal needs (Tyson & Fell 1986: 135; Torrington & Hall 1987: 16; Legge 1995a: 34-35) .
In contrast, 'soft' HRM stresses the active participation of employees, whereby their commitment, adaptability and skills contribute to the attainment of common organisational goals. Employees are seen as capable of development and worthy of trust and collaboration through participation in the management process (Beer et al. 1984; Beer & Eistenstat 1996) . 'Soft' HRM approaches share a common lineage with understandings of management (for example, Human Relations theory) that claim to be people-oriented and committed to increasing motivation. The 'soft' approach to HRM lends itself to pluralist understandings of organisational operations, in which employees are seen as a 'valued asset' with a significant contribution to make to organisational governance. The 'hard' and 'soft' approaches can be seen as points on a continuum against which the strategies adopted by different organisations may be measured.
The extent to which this 'soft' approach has been implemented and whether it is little more than an exercise in rendering employees more easily governable is open to debate (see Storey 1992; Townley 1994; Legge 1995b) . The contradictory character of HRM is apparent in this respect. The pursuit of 'hard' goals can undermine any commitment to 'soft' goals (see Bratton & Gold 1999: 50) . Critical commentators (for example, Sisson 1993) have suggested that this contradiction is indeed insoluble, and that the rhetoric of HRM in both 'hard' and 'soft' dimensions may mask a reality of intensified managerial control and profitmaximisation.
Any classification of HRM practices into 'hard' and 'soft' is no doubt problematic, since much depends on how particular HRM functions (for example, training and development) are implemented in practice. Nonetheless, it appears reasonable to assume that employment contracts which prioritise minimisation of labour costs and numerical flexibility indicate the 'hard' dimension of HRM, whereas an emphasis on such issues as flexibility for employees or staff development is more indicative of a 'soft' approach. The OEA and the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB) claim that AWAs allow employers to integrate both the 'hard' and 'soft' dimensions of contemporary 'strategic' human resource management, providing both greater efficiency and profitability, while also giving employees more flexibility (OEA 1998b: ii-iii) . Therefore, this paper assesses this claim in the light of the available evidence on the content of AWAs.
Evidence of the 'hard' HRM agenda
The September 1999 ACIRRT Agreements Database and Monitor (ADAM) Report provides the most comprehensive information on the significant differences that exist between the wages and conditions experienced by workers covered by AWAs and those covered by certified agreements (ACIRRT 1999: 9) . 4 Union presence is a significant factor. For example, the average annual wage increase for all AWAs current in September 1999 was 3.3%, compared with 4.4% for union agreements 5 (ACIRRT 1999: 9) . Unionised certified agreements are also much more likely to provide for a wage increase over the life of the agreement (79.7%) than AWAs (29.5%).
6 Therefore, wage rates for workers covered by AWAs (of which 71% run for the maximum 3-year duration) are more likely to lag behind union agreements in the longer term (ACIRRT 1999: 9) .
AWAs and certified agreements also appear to be drifting further apart in terms of the conditions and entitlements they provide. For instance, AWAs are far more likely than union agreements to contain provisions that reduce the payment for non-standard working hours (Hawke et al. 1998: 55; ACIRRT 1999: 10) . Likewise, weekly hours of work greater than 38 are more common in AWAs (28.8%) than union agreements (11.8%), and AWAs are more likely to provide a daily span of hours of more than 12 (42.1%, compared to 27.8% of union certified agreements) (ACIRRT 1999: 10) . OEA findings confirm the emphasis on flexible working time arrangements in AWAs. It has been typical practice for employees covered by AWAs to be paid a fixed hourly rate of pay, which has been loaded to compensate for the removal of penalty rates. This has usually been coupled with a 'cashing out' of accrued leave entitlements (especially long service and annual leave), although this process has occurred predominantly at the managerial level (OEA 1999: 14-16) .
Evidence from Queensland on the introduction of Queensland Workplace Agreements (QWAs--the state equivalent of the federal agreements) provides further information on the content of individual agreements. Two reports on QWAs have been published, one produced by the state Department of Employment, Training and Industrial Relations (DETIR) in 1998, the other by ACIRRT in 2000. The first covers the initial wave of QWAs which resulted from the Workplace Relations Act 1997 (Qld), the second covers those QWAs certified after the legislation was amended in September 1998. The amended legislation inserted a 'public interest' test and a tightened 'no disadvantage' test into the process of QWA certification, thereby reducing the opportunity for QWAs to be used simply as a way of reducing conditions of employment.
Despite the change in legislation, both reports concluded that QWAs have been disadvantageous to employee signatories, and that at best there have been no significant improvements in conditions of employment for workers covered by QWAs when compared to workers employed under certified agreements (DETIR 1998: 11; ACIRRT 2000: 20) . 7 The DETIR database shows, for instance, that the average wage increase granted in these agreements was 2.6%, while the average wage increase for certified agreements in the same period was 4.1%, with an average wage increase of 2.9% in awards (that is, safety-net adjustments). More tellingly, however, a later DETIR paper reports ACIRRT data from 1999 showing that only 4.1% of QWAs made provision for wage increases over the life of the agreement compared to 78.1% of Queensland certified agreements (DETIR 1999: 8) . Thus, many employees in Queensland who have been placed on QWAs will fall below the equivalent award rates, despite initial wage increases provided by some agreements (DETIR 1998: 5) It is further apparent that the focus of QWAs is on repackaging award entitlements to suit the needs of employers, rather than introducing genuinely innovative changes to the workplace (DETIR 1998: 5) . The review of QWAs carried out by DETIR reveals substantial erosion of employee entitlements in many important areas. Of the agreements analysed, 38.7% increased ordinary weekly hours, 53.0% increased the span of hours, 69.4% removed or decreased penalty rate entitlements and 42.5% removed overtime (DETIR 1998: 6) . These outcomes are particularly interesting when considered in the context of a comparative assessment between QWAs and certified agreements. For example, only 2% of the 142 certified agreements examined by DETIR contained clauses that stipulated increasing hours of work (DETIR 1998: 5) . The DETIR (1998) report concludes that changes that may not have been introduced in awards due to the opposition of unions and public scrutiny of the Industrial Relations Commission, were able to be introduced in QWAs due to the relatively weaker bargaining position of individual employees and the secrecy provisions in the legislation (DETIR 1998: 7) .
Although changes in the legislation in 1998 may have diluted the potential for QWAs to be used to cut conditions, the outcomes for the employees covered in the ACIRRT (2000) report were still noticeably worse than for those working under unionised certified agreements. Two-thirds (65%) of QWAs failed to specify ordinary working hours, as compared to only 38% of certified agreements. Nearly 10% of QWAs (8.2% and 7.4%) absorbed annual leave and sick leave entitlements into wages. One-third of QWAs stipulated working hours of more than 40 hours per week, as against no certified agreements, while 41.8% of QWAs made provision for 'averaging' of hours as against 29.4% of unionised certified agreements (ACIRRT 2000: 14-16) .
Evidence of the 'soft' HRM agenda
The OEA and Federal Government have devoted significant effort to promoting the potential for AWAs to advance 'win-win' outcomes for employers and workers (OEA 1999) . One area that has received particular attention has been that of 'family-friendly' provisions. According to the OEA's study of 1056 weighted AWAs as at the end of December 1998, 79% of AWAs contained at least one family-friendly provision. These included family/carer's leave (66%), flexible hours provisions (56%), regular part-time work provisions, and paid maternity leave (30%) (DEWRSB 1999: 88; OEA 1999: 16) . The weighting of these data has significant implications for their interpretation, as weighting tends to increase the profile of those AWAs in the large firms and public sector which tend to have relatively good practice in relation to family-friendly policies, building as they do on established employment practices. Unweighted data would reveal very different outcomes and would be more representative of the spectrum of employer-employee relationships.
Other studies emphasise areas where AWAs and certified agreements are relatively similar with respect to 'soft' HRM provisions. Hawke et al (1998: 50-51) , for example, point out that 71% of employees covered by AWAs had a leave provision in their agreement, compared to 74% of employees covered by certified agreements. ACIRRT publications have, by contrast, tended to emphasise the differences between AWAs and other forms of agreement in relation to 'soft' HRM provisions. According to ACIRRT research, AWAs are less likely than certified agreements to cover issues associated with employee development such as training, consultative measures, family-friendly measures and OHS issues (ACIRRT 1999: 9) . Similarly, ACIRRT's report on QWAs certified between September 1998 and July 1999 found that 12.3% of such agreements included OHS provisions as against 57.6% of unionised certified agreements, while 30.3% of QWAs referred to training, as against 74.1% of certified agreements (ACIRRT 2000: 18) .
Only one of the 122 QWAs studied included a clause on 'balancing work and family life' compared to 11 out of the 85 certified agreements (ACIRRT 2000: 18) . The same number of QWAs made provision for career paths ('promotion or progression based on acquisition of skills'), as compared to 13 certified agreements (ACIRRT 2000: 28) . A mere 2.3% of QWAs included consultative mechanisms as against 65% of Queensland certified agreements (ACIRRT 2000: 19) . By contrast, 15.3% of certified agreements included clauses on teamwork, as against only 1.6% of QWAs.
Interpreting data on the pervasiveness of 'soft' HRM provisions in AWAs is hampered by the lack of agreement on what might be included in this category, with the OEA pointing to 'flexible hours' as indicative of a family-friendly provision, while ADAM reports suggest that arrangements such as averaging of hours, 'flexible' start and finish times, and 'negotiable' hours of work, are usually detrimental to workers' interests. Another problem is that some analyses use the agreement or the employee, rather than the employer as the unit of analysis. Such analyses are therefore potentially biased by large employers signing multiple similarly, if not identically, worded agreements. 8 Finally, in the case of the OEA submission to the Senate Inquiry into the 'second wave' legislation, no indication is given as to the nature of the database from which the Office's conclusions are drawn.
In order to address these problems, we have constructed a database of single AWAs from all 539 different employers who had signed an AWA between March 1997 (when provision for AWAs was first introduced) and June 1998 under Part vi (d) of the 1996 Federal Workplace Relations Act. Each AWA is the first one signed by that employer with one of his/her employees. Table 1 indicates the distribution of employers in our dataset. The sample is based on a population of 22 471 AWAs approved in this period and was obtained for this paper on subscription from the OEA in 1998 and provided as a confidential 'sample set' selected by the OEA for recognised research organisations. The resultant database was unweighted to overcome the problems identified above.
Data detailing the various terms and conditions of work stipulated in the contracts were extracted from the sample. We identified fifteen provisions as being indicative of 'soft HRM'. These were: training; career path; personal review; antidiscrimination; equal employment opportunity (EEO); occupational health and safety (OHS); child care; parental/maternity leave; family leave; compassionate leave; flexi-time; consultation; disputes resolution; part-time work; and sick leave. The variables were constructed in terms of presence and depth, with the latter measured on the basis of (1) no content, (2) one-to-two sentences of content (minimal content), (3) three-to-five sentences or a few paragraphs of content up to one page in total (moderate content) and (4) a page or more of content (extensive content). In addition to these four categories, two further categories were introduced to cover cases where respondents to the agreement referred to other documentation. The first was 'As per award' which covered those cases where the agreement simply referred to the award. The category 'See Workplace Relations Act 1996' covers those cases where a phrase of that nature had been inserted in the agreement. The data analysis is divided into two sections. Table 2 gives data on 'soft' HRM practices at a highly aggregated level. The second section, represented by Tables  3 and 4 , analyses the data at a less aggregated level. Each provision is examined in terms of its presence and depth of content among the agreements surveyed. Table 2 indicates that 26.5% of agreements contained no 'soft' HRM provisions. Overall, the range of 'soft' HRM provisions was typically narrow, with two-thirds having four or fewer provisions, only 11.5% having seven or more, and the modal number being just over two.
Of the 'soft' HRM provisions mentioned, dispute resolution and antidiscrimination were relatively common ( Table 4 ). The high incidence of these two issues is unremarkable, since these are the only two clauses required by the Workplace Relations Act. What is remarkable though, is that the OEA certified between 40% and 46% of agreements that did not include reference to dispute resolution or anti-discrimination despite such legislation. Outside these two mandatory clauses, sick leave was relatively common, followed by parental/ maternity leave and training. All others were cited in less than one quarter of cases and, in the case of career paths, performance review, consultation, child care, EEO, flexi-time, the respective figures were below 4%.
Where 'soft' HRM provisions were incorporated in AWAs, very little depth was evident. Restricting our analysis to those clauses that appeared with some frequency (that is in 10% or more of agreements), only the mandatory disputes resolution clause contained extensive detail. More than half the clauses relating to anti-discrimination referred the reader to the Workplace Relations Act. This might have included simply a reference to the relevant section of the Act, the full provisions as set out in the Act, or simply a selection of these provisions. This lack of inclusion of the full details of employee rights under antidiscrimination legislation and the complete details of dispute resolution procedure is of concern.
One-third of the clauses relating to parental/ maternity leave also directed the parties to refer to the Act. Relatively few 'soft' HRM clauses made reference to the relevant award, those referring to compassionate leave and parental/ maternity leave doing so in 11% and 13% of cases respectively. Outside these cases, the vast majority of agreements did not elaborate terms and conditions beyond a few paragraphs. In some cases this may have been because the content of the clause was relatively simple to summarise briefly (sick leave or compassionate leave being cases in point), but this was clearly not the case in others. For example, OHS and training are two areas of some complexity but one-quarter of clauses referring to these conditions were no longer than one or two sentences, suggesting only the most cursory attention to these important workplace HRM issues.
AWAs: intent and outcomes
Just as the classification of 'hard' and 'soft' provisions is problematic, so too the coding of provisions as minimal content, moderate content and extensive content does not assess the nature or quality of the provisions. Full analysis of the content of each provision would be a task beyond the scope of this project. Furthermore, an important limitation of this study is that we have not attempted to compare AWA provisions with those that existed in the relevant award which evidently limits our ability to make any judgments as to whether the AWA represents a superior or inferior outcome when compared to award conditions. 9 Nonetheless, despite these limitations, some valid observations can be made. First, individual AWAs (as provided by the OEA) varied from single page documents with one variation on the award to 50-page documents with comprehensive coverage of employment conditions effectively supplanting the relevant award. Nonetheless, the former may incorporate quite drastic changes to conditions of employment. One example of a one-page AWA which coexisted with an award included a clause setting a weekly wage amount 'regardless of hours actually worked (excluding days off, then one day's wages would be lost per day off).' The quid pro quo for the employee in this case was that 'he is picked up and dropped off for work near his place of residence', allowing him to continue living at his present address.
The stated relationship of AWAs to awards also varies widely throughout the sample. The documents may contain no reference to a relationship with the relevant award or they may state that the agreement completely overrides the appropriate award. However, many AWAs remain firmly grounded in the award system, as exemplified by the following extract:
Except as provided by this Agreement, the condition of employment of the employee to whom this Agreement applies shall be those contained in the Award at the date this Agreement is approved by the Employment Advocate. Where there is inconsistency between this Agreement and the Award, this Agreement shall prevail.
For the purpose of this paper the term 'intent' has been used to express whether a provision is directed primarily towards the benefit of employer, employee or both. These three possibilities may be illustrated through reference to training and staff development. For the employer, the provision of training and development may be seen as an investment returning competitive advantage over other firms in the industry: a multi-skilled staff can improve functional flexibility within a firm and hence increase productivity. For employees, the acquisition of training and skills may be seen as part of the employment contract: the acquisition of highly valued, portable skills increases employees' bargaining power (see Ewer et al. 1991: 120-123 and Lansbury & Pickersgill 2000: 49-50) . Training provisions within AWAs can be viewed as a 'soft' measure insofar as they appear to provide mutually beneficial outcomes for employers and employees.
Closer examination of the training provisions shows that the wording of AWAs allows for a variety of interpretations of employee rights and obligations. First, the training provision of agreements may simply contain a global statement such as 'the employer will provide training where necessary'. The second type of provision found in AWAs is directive in nature, as indicated by clauses such as 'employee must participate in training as directed', 'training will be provided as is consistent with the company's needs', and 'must participate in job rotation'. This directive approach is also evident in the requirement found in a small number of agreements, that employees will be expected to work in both higher and lower classifications. In ten agreements, employees were directed to reciprocate by using their skills to train others.
Much of the detail regarding training provision involved specifying employer and employee responsibilities for training costs and the provision of training time. The variation within these arrangements is extensive. Allocation of training funds and reimbursement of costs range from full compensation by the employer including the provision of paid time off to the entire responsibility for costs resting with employees who must also undertake training in their own time.
The dichotomy between 'hard' or 'soft' provisions can be illustrated in relation to leave entitlements and flexi-time. Some clearly embraced a 'soft' HRM philosophy detailing a range of leave entitlements including carer's leave and provision for religious or ceremonial leave. For example, one agreement stated the following:
An employee with responsibilities to either member of his or her immediate family or members of his or her household who need the employee's care and support will be entitled to use in accordance with this sub clause, any sick leave entitlement accrued to provide care and support for such persons when they are ill.
However, the presence of such provisions need not indicate a 'soft' approach to other arrangements. For example, one agreement offered up to '38 hours paid leave in any complete year' to be deducted from employees' sick leave as well as possible unpaid carer's leave by arrangement. Yet it also prescribed the following in relation to hours of work:
The parties accept that a critical requirement for the success of [the organisation] is flexible work conditions and hours of work to meet the needs of the [the organisation] and particularly the fluctuating [demand] . . .
10
The employee will be required to be on-call for a minimum of one week out of two.
The employee will not be entitled to accrue and take programmed days off.
It should be noted that these arrangements tend to apply to full-time, relatively secure work. Other agreements include statements such as 'the hours of work of the employee will be as required by the employer' or vague wording such as 'flexible work may be worked according to specific arrangements made between individual employees and immediate managers'. Many agreements do not address issues such as flexible hours and carer's leave.
In summary, there is evidence from a range of sources that the general trend of AWAs is towards the 'hard' HRM philosophy of cost minimisation and maximisation of flexibility of hours. Contrary to Government predictions, there is little evidence that AWAs are being used to advance the philosophy of 'soft' HRM. Provisions based around the developmental and personal needs of employees are relatively uncommon and, where they occur, are relatively brief. These findings are significant for future employment conditions in an increasingly deregulated labour market.
CONCLUSION
The Business Council of Australia (BCA) has argued that in a deregulated labour market, without 'obstacles' such as awards and trade unions, employers and employees will be able to reach agreements that meet the needs of both parties.
11
AWAs give employers the opportunity to forge such agreements (subject to certain minimum restrictions such as the 'no disadvantage' test and the need to abide by the basic laws of employment), and can therefore be interpreted as the closest indicator of a 'pure' employer agenda towards employees in a deregulated labour market of the type that the BCA has long advocated.
12 Our findings, which weight each employer equally, suggest that the tendency for employers, free from the 'fetters' of trade union/ 'third party' intervention and the potential for public investigation, is not to seek out agreements that benefit the interests of both industrial parties.
Indeed, as ACIRRT (2000: 20) concluded, only the modest changes to the Queensland state legislation in September 1998 prevented even worse outcomes for the employees covered by QWAs. While the Queensland example indicates that regulation can be introduced to restrict the negative impact of individual agreements, it also shows that the outcomes from individual bargaining are considerably inferior for non-managerial employees than those achieved through collective bargaining.
The available evidence on AWAs in practice indicates the implementation of a wage-minimising, labour intensification logic. This research provides evidence of the underlying reasons why many employers may use AWAs to undermine trade unionism and to formalise long-standing informal arrangements (Hearn McKinnon 1997: 58-62; Hawke et al. 1998: 51; Wooden 1999: 27 )--that is, to reduce wages and conditions. These data add to the extensive body of research that suggests that trade unionism and the maintenance of awards are essential for the protection of workers' industrial conditions. These are strong conclusions. It is important to note that there are two major limitations to this study which bear on these findings. First is the highly aggregated nature of the report. Peetz (1999: 11) points out that AWAs have been used for three quite discrete groups of employees, presumably for three different sets of reasons and with three different logics: public-sector managers formally covered by awards; the Victorian workforce, stripped of access to state awards by the legislation of the former Kennett Government; 13 and key areas of unionised employment, such as the mining industry. Further research should enable us to differentiate between AWAs covering these groups of workers. The second limitation is the purely numerical examination of the incidence and depth of various provisions in AWAs. This potentially creates a misleading impression of the actual impact of these agreements. There are cases where actually very extensive provisions may be conveyed by a sentence or two while, by contrast, two or three pages of clauses which we have coded as being 'extensive' might only provide very lean conditions for the relevant employee. It is also clear with AWAs, as in all aspects of industrial relations, there may be extensive differences between the words in the contract and the actual practice. This is particularly likely to be the case, and particularly likely to have detrimental effects on employees, where
